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This paper analyzes the behavior of monopoly ﬁrm serving its products
to two countries. The main focus of this paper is on how the product-quality
choice in diﬀerent markets are related with the cost structure of the ﬁrm.
First, This paper examines the eﬀects of production and R&D costs on the
product quality separately, and then discusses the general case where the
both costs exists. This paper shows that if only production costs exist,
providing diﬀerent levels of product quality is optimal and that if only R&D
costs exist, providing the same level of quality is optimal. About the general
case, this paper shows the conditions with which the same-quality strategy
is optimal in terms of utility and other parameters. As an application,
this paper discusses the ﬁrm’s decision on entry in a foreign market either
by exports or FDI. The result is consistent with observations in emerging
economies.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F12, F23, O33.
Keywords: Product Quality, Diﬀerent Markets, Costs of Quality.
∗Financial support from College of Commerce, Nihon University is gratefully acknowledged.
College of Commerce, Nihon University. Mailing Address: 5-2-1 Kinuta, Setagaya, Tokyo 157-
8570 Japan. Phone and Fax: +81-3-3749-6868. E-mail: matsubara.kiyoshi@nihon-u.ac.jp1 Introduction
It is often said that many Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms are struggling in the
markets of emerging economies, despite their high technology and product quality.
Some people even argue that Japanese ﬁrms provide with unnecessarily high quality
and/or many features by their products that are not demanded by the customers
in those markets, resulting in their loss of competitiveness against their rivals. On
the other hand, it is also asserted that Japanese consumers are so demanding that
Japanese ﬁrms always brush up the quality of their products and services. These
observations arise one question: how ﬁrms determine the quality of their products
in each of diﬀerent markets.
IO literature, pioneered by the seminal work by Mussa and Rosen (1978), dis-
cusses ﬁrm’s decision on quality and price. The focus is, however, on how ﬁrms
determine their price and quality in a market with diﬀerent types of consumers,
say, relatively quality-sensitive consumers and others. In such a market, revela-
tion of consumers’ type is important for the setting of quality and price. Another
issue is how to formulate costs of product quality. On one hand, maintaining the
product quality with more production may increase the costs. One the other hand,
as another strand of IO literature suggests, a ﬁxed spending not related with the
quantity but quality such as R&D can be important.1 In some studies of the
trade literature, ﬁrms’ ability other than productivity is introduced to the ﬁrm-
heterogeneity model a la Melitz (2003).2 However, their focus is on how to explain
the relationship of ﬁrm heterogeneity with ﬁrms’ operation in domestic/foreign
markets, which is diﬀerent from this paper’s.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the behavior of monopoly ﬁrm serving its
products to two countries. Consumers in country 1 are assumed to be more quality
sensitive than those in country 2 due to their higher income and other factors
(Imagine a developed and developing countries as countries 1 and 2 respectively).
The number of country 2 consumers is assumed to be higher than that in country
1, so the country 2 is also the important market for the monopoly ﬁrm, which is
located in country 1. The expenditure of the ﬁrm consists of production and R&D
costs. The main question in this paper is how the cost structure and other factors
aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision on the level of product quality in the two markets.
The contributions of this work is to relate the quality choice in diﬀerent mar-
kets with the cost structure of the ﬁrm. This paper shows that whether supply-
ing low-quality products in country 2 is proﬁtable depends on how the product
1See Acharyya (2005) about a formula of production costs including product quality. Syme-
onidis (2003) analyzes oligopoly markets where ﬁrms perform R&D in vestments to improve the
quality of their products, but the production costs are independent of quality.
2For instance, Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) develop a two-factor heterogeneous-ﬁrm model.
They introduce a factor, which they call caliber, aﬀecting the ﬁxed costs of the product quality.
They derive the cutoﬀ function showing the minimum level of caliber for a given productivity
necessary to survive in the market. On the plain of caliber and productivity, the cutoﬀ function
is a downward-sloping curve. By introducing ﬁxed cost of exports and iceberg transport cost,
they show the cutoﬀ function of exporter. They show that two kinds of exporters, with low-
productivity, high-caliber and high-productivity, low-caliber, may exist.
1quality aﬀects the proﬁts, as well as utility and population parameters. There-
fore, this paper provides some clue to understanding the behavior of developed-
country ﬁrms operating in both developed and developing countries. For instance,
many developed-country ﬁrms in IT industry establish R&D centers in emerging
economies such as China and India. One reason is to utilize skilled workers in those
countries, some argue, but others may be related with the results in this paper.
This paper examines the eﬀects of production and R&D costs on the product
quality separately, and then discusses the general case where the both costs exists.
This paper shows that if only production costs exist, providing diﬀerent levels
of product quality is optimal and that if only R&D costs exist, providing the
same level of quality is optimal. About the general case, this paper shows the
conditions with which the same-quality strategy is optimal in terms of utility and
other other parameters. As an application, this paper discusses the ﬁrm’s decision
on entry in country 2 market either by exports or FDI. The result is consistent
with observations in emerging economies.
This paper is organized as follows. In section two, the basic setup of the model is
shown. In section three, the ﬁrm’s decision with two diﬀerent markets is examined.
Two cases are discussed separately; (1) no R&D costs, and (2) no production
costs. In the each case, proﬁts with the same quality level in the two markets and
those with diﬀerent levels are compared. Then, in section four, the general case
is analyzed. Section ﬁve discusses ﬁrm’s choice between exports and FDI. Section
six concludes this paper.
2 Model
In this section, the basic setup of the model is described. A monopoly market
in which both the quality and price of a good are important for consumers is
considered. First, the utility of a representative consumer, which is used in the
previous literature since Mussa and Rosen (1978), is assumed. Then, how the
product quality is related with costs is discussed.
2.1 Consumer’s Utility
Suppose that the utility function of a consumer is
U = aq − p,
where q is the quality of the good, p is the price, and a is a positive constant showing
the degree of preference for the quality. The monopoly ﬁrm charges the price of
aq for a given level of the quality q to take all the surplus from the consumer. If
more than one type of consumer in terms of a exist in the market, such all-taking
price setting is diﬃcult for the ﬁrm. When the ﬁrm cannot identify the type of
each consumer, some types of consumers are better oﬀ by consuming a package of
(a, q) that the ﬁrm does not want them to consume.3 However, when discussing
3See Acharyya (2005) for such possibilities.
2two diﬀerent markets in this paper, these markets are assumed to be segregated
in a sense that consumers in country 1 cannot buy products sold in country 2 and
vice versa, which allows the ﬁrm to subtract all consumer surpluses in the each
market. Therefore, any arbitrage activity such as parallel imports is excluded. This
assumption makes the analysis tractable and allow the analysis of quality choice
under various cost structures.
The next question is how the ﬁrm determines the level of the product quality.
To answer this question, costs of the quality need to be speciﬁed.
2.2 Costs of Product Quality
Consider the following general form of the costs
C(x,q) = c(x,q) + F(q),
where x is the quantity produced. The ﬁrst term is the production costs. It is
assumed that for a given level of x, c increases as q increases, i.e., producing a
higher-quality good costs more. Possible reasons are the necessity of more skilled
workers both for production and sales, superior quality machines, and other forms
of more sophisticated technology. The second term is the R&D costs, which does
not depend on x. actually, any costs that are needed for the product quality and
do not depend on the quantity produced may be included in the second term:
marketing is an example. Therefore, ”R&D costs” is just a expediential name of
the costs having the above two characteristics.4










where c and d are positive constants, capturing the impact of quality on costs















where n is the number of consumers. From equation (1), it seems that production
and R&D costs have diﬀerent eﬀects on the proﬁts. To see that, the following two
extreme cases (1) only production costs (d = 0) and (2) only R&D costs (c = 0)
are examined separately.
In case (1), from the ﬁrst order condition with respect to q, the optimal level
of the quality is a
c. Similarly in case (2), the optimal level of q is na
d . The diﬀerence
between these two cases is the eﬀect of n, the number of consumers. The production
4Iyer and Kuksov (2010) develop a model of vertically diﬀerentiated market where consumers
cannot observe the true quality of the product and the quality perceived by the consumers depends
on both the true quality and other activities such as merchandizing and store atmospherics, which
they call aﬀect. Although in this paper the consumers can perceive the true quality of the product,
”aﬀect” may be interpreted as a part of factors composing product quality.
3costs do not have a market-size eﬀect while the R&D costs do. Even in the one-
market case, the diﬀerence in the cost structure matters.
In the next section, two markets that are diﬀerent in the number of consumers
and also the preference for the quality are analyzed.
3 Two Diﬀerent Markets
Suppose that two markets, country 1 (home) and country 2 (foreign), exist. Besides
additional costs to sell in market 2 due to trade costs and others, the diﬀerence
in the degree of quality evaluation between the consumers in the two markets is
assumed as follows:
a = a1 ≥ a2 = 1.
This assumption implies that the consumers in market 1 is more sensitive to the
quality of the good they consume.






























where ni, qi, and t are number of consumers in market i, the product quality
supplied in market i, and a unit extra cost in market 2 respectively. Besides the
sensitiveness of the quality ai, the two markets can be diﬀerent in terms of the
market size, measured by ni. It is assumed that the production/sales costs are the
same in the two markets, except for the trade costs in market 2, as well as the
R&D costs, which makes the model simple.
Our focus is on whether supplying the same quality in the two markets is more
proﬁtable and how it is aﬀected by the cost structure. About the R&D costs, it
is assumed that if the ﬁrm supplies diﬀerent level of quality in the each market, it
must perform R&D separately by its local R&D center. This assumption means
that if the ﬁrm supplies the same quality in the both markets, then the ﬁrm can
save the R&D costs. As in the one-market case, ﬁrst the two extreme cases of
d = 0 and c = 0 are examined. Then the general case where both the production
and R&D costs exist is discussed in the next section.
3.1 Case of Only Production Costs




















We compare the following two cases: (1) q1 = q2 = q (common level of the product
quality), and (2) q1 may be diﬀerent from q2.
43.1.1 Same Quality Level in the Two Markets


















From the ﬁrst order condition with respect to q, the optimal levels of the product

















3.1.2 Diﬀerent Quality Levels
From the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to q1 and q2, the optimal levels of the



















1 ≥ q∗ ≥ q∗
2, implying that compared to the common quality case,
consumers in country 1 get higher-quality products while consumers in country 2






3.1.3 Comparison of Proﬁts of Two Quality Strategies
From equations (6) and (8), it is shown that
π





Therefore, the proﬁts with diﬀerent levels of the product quality is higher than
those with the common level, unless the consumers of the two markets have the
same level of the quality sensitiveness, i.e. a = 1. The following proposition
summarizes the result.
Proposition 1 The optimal strategy for the monopoly ﬁrm is to assign diﬀerent
levels of product quality to each of the two markets, if only the production costs
exist.
However, this result does not hold in case where only the R&D costs exist, which
is discussed in the next subsection. Again, proﬁts in the two cases are compared.
53.2 Case of Only R&D Costs
Suppose that the production costs do not exist. Then, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are as
follows.










2 − n2t. (10)
We compare the following two cases as in the case where only the production costs
exist: (1) q1 = q2 = q and (2) q1 may be diﬀerent from q2.
3.2.1 Same Quality Level in the Two Markets
The ﬁrm’s proﬁts are the following.




2 − n2t. (11)
Compared to equation (10), in case of the common quality in the two markets, the
ﬁrm may utilize the scale economy to save the R&D costs. Note that the coeﬃcient
for the quality cost (dq2) is one half, not one. From the ﬁrst order condition with

















3.2.2 Diﬀerent Quality Levels
From the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to q1 and q2, the optimal levels of the


















As the single-market case shows, the optimal levels of quality depends on the
market size ni as well as the utility and cost parameters (a and d respectively).








3.2.3 Comparison of Proﬁts of Two Quality Strategies
From equations (13) and (15), it is shown that
π





Therefore, unlike the case where only the production costs exist, the proﬁts with
the common level of the product quality is higher than those with diﬀerent level
of it in the each market. The following proposition summarizes the result.
6Proposition 2 The optimal strategy for the monopoly ﬁrm is to assign the com-
mon level of product quality to each of the two markets, if only the R&D costs
exist.
In the next section, the general case where both the production and R&D costs
exist is analyzed, based on the results in this section.
4 General Case
As in the last section, we compare the proﬁts with the common level of the product
quality with those with diﬀerent levels.






















From the ﬁrst order condition with respect to q, the optimal levels of the product



























c(n1 + n2) + d
+
2an1n2
c(n1 + n2) + d
)
− n2t. (19)
The proﬁts with the diﬀerent quality levels are as in equation (2). From the
ﬁrst order conditions with respect to q1 and q2, the optimal levels of the product



































From equations (19) and (21), it is shown that
π















Inside the curly brackets, the ﬁrst term, denoted by f(a), is linear in a, the pa-
rameter of quality sensitiveness in country 1, while the second term, denoted by
7s(a), is a quadratic function of a. If f(a) is greater than s(a), then the proﬁts with
common quality level are higher than those with diﬀerent levels, and vice versa.
Figure 1 describes how a and other variables aﬀects the optimal quality strat-
egy.5 The most important result shown by Figure 1 is that a cutoﬀ point of a
exists: if a < a∗, s(a) < f(a), and if a ≥ a∗, s(a) ≥ f(a).6 To understand the































(cn1 + d)2 −
cn2
(cn2 + d)2 < 0.
Figure 1 shows that which quality strategy is better depends on the level of quality
sensitiveness in country 1, a. The above comparative statics shows how the line
s(a) moves as each of the variables other than a changes. First, an increase in c,
production cost parameter, shifts up s(a), which decreases a∗. This production-
cost eﬀect gets larger as the R&D cost parameter d increases. Second, an increase
in n1, number of customers in country 1, rotates s(a) counterclockwise and thus
decreases a∗. Third, an increase in n2, number of customers in country 2, shifts
up s(a), which decreases a∗. Note that increases in the number of customers in
either countries decreases the cutoﬀ value of a, although ways of s(a)’s moving are
diﬀerent between n1 and n2. Last, an increase in d, R&D cost parameter, rotates
s(a) clockwise and simultaneously shits it down, resulting an increase in a∗.
The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that both the production and R&D costs exist. Then, a
cutoﬀ value of the utility parameter of country 1 consumer exists. If the parameter
is lower than that, the optimal strategy is the common level of product quality. If it
is higher than the cutoﬀ value, the optimal strategy is the diﬀerent levels of quality.
The production cost parameter has a negative eﬀect on the cutoﬀ value while the
R&D cost parameter has a positive one. Market size parameters have negative
eﬀects on the cutoﬀ value.
5 Application: Exports vs. FDI
So far, it is shown that the level of quality sensitiveness in Country 1 is important
for the ﬁrm to determine its quality strategy. However, in the current setup, the









> 1, which is the solution for f(a) = s(a).
8unit trade cost t has no eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s decision, because the trade costs, n2t,
is the same for the both the common- and diﬀerent-quality level cases. Actually,
when the trade cost, including tariﬀ and other trade barriers, is high, FDI may be
more attractive than exports for ﬁrms entering foreign markets. In this section,
the setup is slightly changed to analyze the ﬁrm’s decision of plant location and
quality level.
Suppose that in case of FDI, the ﬁrm can save the trade costs. Instead, it
is assume that the ﬁrm can choose only the diﬀerent-quality strategy with FDI
and that it can choose only the common-quality strategy with exports. With
FDI, the ﬁrm has R&D centers in both countries to adjust the quality level of its
product in the each market, which is a plausible setup. The maximized proﬁts
with export, denoted by π∗(Exports), are the right hand side of the equation (19).
The maximized proﬁts with FDI, denoted by π∗(FDI), are the right hand side of
the equation (21) plus the trade costs n2t, because the ﬁrm needs not to pay for





















From equation (23), the level of unit trade cost equating the proﬁts of the two





























Figure 2 plots a t∗ curve, which is a quadratic function of a, on (a,t) plane. If
a ∈ [1,¯ a] and t < tMax = d
2c(cn2+d), exporting the common-quality product is the
optimal strategy.7 Otherwise, FDI with diﬀerent-quality product is the best for
the ﬁrm.
What are the eﬀects of population and cost parameters on the optimal plant
location and quality for the ﬁrm? First, an increase in n2, number of consumers
in country 2, shifts down the t∗ curve, making FDI/diﬀerent quality more likely.
Note that when the t∗ curve is shifted down, ¯ a decreases.
The eﬀect of n1, number of consumers in country 1, is rather subtle, because it











2{c(n1 + n2) + d}2(cn1 + d)
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Inside the square brackets, the ﬁrst term is negative because a ≥ 1, and thus
the sum of the three terms is also negative. In the ﬁrst fraction, the sign of the
7a and ¯ a are the solutions for − cn1
cn1+d · a2 + 2a − cn2
cn2+d = 0. ¯ a is equal to a∗ in footnote 4. It
is shown that a < 1.
9numerator depends on the level of a : it is positive if a > 1 + d
cn1 and is negative
otherwise. Therefore the overall eﬀect of n1 is negative if a > 1+ d
cn1 and is positive
otherwise.
Figure 3 shows how the optimal strategy changes as n1 increases. The t∗ curve
switches from the dotted line t∗
0 to the solid line t∗
1. tmax is unchanged because it
does not depend on n1. Two special areas should draw an attention. One is the
area labeled “Exports→FDI,” the area with large a. If (a,t) is in this area, the
optimal strategy is switched from exports to FDI by an increase in n1. A similar
result is in Proposition 3 (case when t is not important). However, the other area
labeled “FDI→Exports,” which has low a and high t, shows a diﬀerent result. If
(a,t) is in this area, the optimal strategy is switched from FDI to exports by an
increase in n1.





1{(cn1 + d)(−cn1 + d) − c2n1n2}
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cn1(2cn1 + cn2 + 2d)
)2
+
n1(2c2n1n2 − d2)[{c2(n1 + n2) + 2cd}(n1 + n2) + d2]
2c{c(n1 + n2) + d}2(2cn1 + cn2 + 2d)(cn2 + d)2 (27)
Production cost parameter, c, has a negative eﬀect if cn1 > d and a > 1+ d
cn1. R&D
cost parameter, d, has a negative eﬀect if 2c2n1n2 < d2 and a <
(cn1+d)2
cn1(2cn1+cn2+2d).
The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the ﬁrm have two strategies to enter the country 2
market: (1) exports with common product quality and (2) FDI with diﬀerent prod-
uct quality. Then, a threshold curve of the unit trade cost exists. If the pair of
the utility parameter of country 1 consumer and the unit trade cost is in the area
below the threshold curve, then the ﬁrm chooses exports/common quality strategy.
Otherwise, it chooses FDI/diﬀerent quality strategy. The eﬀects of cost parameters
on the threshold curve depends on the utility parameter and which cost parameters
are relatively larger. Depending on the level of utility parameter, market size pa-
rameters have opposite eﬀects: the number of consumers in country 1 many have
a positive eﬀect while that of country 2 always has a negative one.
One important diﬀerence between Proposition 3 and 4 is the eﬀect of market size
parameters. If the unit trade cost does not matter, growth of either markets
makes diﬀerent-quality strategy, i.e. FDI, more likely (Proposition 3). If the unit
trade cost matters, on the other hand, the growth of country 1 market makes
diﬀerent-quality strategy more likely only when the diﬀerence in quality sensitive-
ness between the two market is large (Proposition 4). This result of Proposition 4
10is consistent with observations in emerging markets. Firms from developed coun-
tries are reported not to sell the same products as they sell in their home countries.
Rather, many argues that they sell cheaper products with lower quality or smaller
volume: typical examples are consumer products such as detergent and bug killer.
This is an example of diﬀerent-quality strategy.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the behavior of monopoly ﬁrm serving its products to two
countries. This paper shows how the product quality choice in diﬀerent markets
are related with the cost structure of the ﬁrm. This paper ﬁrst examines the
eﬀects of production and R&D costs on the product quality separately, and then
discusses the general case where the both costs exists. This paper shows that if only
production costs exist, providing diﬀerent levels of product quality is optimal and
that if only R&D costs exist, providing the same level of quality is optimal. About
the general case, this paper shows the conditions with which the same-quality
strategy is optimal in terms of utility and other other parameters. The result in
the general case is changed when quality-choice problem is jointly discussed with
exports-FDI choice.
One limitation of this paper is that welfare analysis is not meaningful. Because
of market segregation, the monopoly ﬁrm takes all consumer surpluses in the both
markets. The second limitation is the form of product diﬀerentiation. In this
paper, the goods are assumed to be vertically diﬀerentiated. Thus horizontally-
diﬀerentiated products are beyond the analysis of this paper.8
The third limitation, related with the ﬁrst one, is that the two markets are
monopolized. Morita and Nguyen (2009) develop a duopoly model where a north
ﬁrm enters the south market either by exports or FDI and FDI spillovers exist.
They assume that in the south market two types of consumers about their quality
preferences. They perform comparative statics about a tariﬀ rate, which the north
ﬁrm must pay in case of exports. They show that a high tariﬀ rate is not necessarily
harmful for the southern country. Although their model is complicated due to
consideration of consumers’ rationality constraints and FDI spillovers, making the
country 2 market duopoly but a single type of consumers is a possible future
extension.
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Figure 2: Quality Sensitivity in Country 1, Unit 
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Figure 3: Effect of larger n1 
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